FCA. 7 Although the United States Supreme Court has provided a general definition of "materiality,"-"a false statement is material if it has a 'natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed'" 8 -the definition has failed to provide guidance to the circuit courts in the context of the FCA. As a result of FERA, the FCA now defines "material" in § 3729(b)(4) as "having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property," 9 which is clearly similar to the definition provided by the Supreme Court. Some circuits adopted a test from the Court's definition called the natural tendency test, which finds that the materiality of a false statement turns on "whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence agency action or is capable of influencing agency action." 10 Other circuits have applied an outcome determinative test, which requires a showing that the alleged fraudulent actions had "the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally deprive the United States of money it is lawfully due . . . ."
11
To resolve the discrepancies in finding liability under the FCA, circuit courts should all apply the same elements and the same tests to alleged false or fraudulent claims. Based on the legislative intent, common law of general fraud, and FERA, materiality is an element of a civil FCA claim. Because of the statute's unique remedial-punitive nature, courts should apply a more restrictive test than the natural tendency test 12 and a less restrictive test than the outcome determinative test. 13 The test should be a substantial weight test: while the government need not actually have paid the false claim, the alleged false statement must be the type often considered by the government in the decisionmaking process, and its effect must be given substantial weight in the government's decision to pay the claim. Courts could apply this test, and thus the FCA, more uniformly and remain consistent with the general definition of materiality set forth by the Supreme Court, FERA, and the purpose of the FCA as set forth in the legislative history.
To support these conclusions, this Note will analyze the legislative intent and statutory history of the FCA in Part II. Part III will describe the current status of the circuit splits with regard to the role of materiality in determining liability under the FCA. Part IV will set forth an analysis and a clearer description of the proposed substantial weight test.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The FCA was enacted "in 1863 to combat rampant fraud and corruption in the sale of supplies and provisions to the Union army during the Civil War."
14 The FCA's original civil penalties provided for "double the amount of damages suffered by the United States as a result of a false claim, plus a forfeiture of two thousand dollars for each false claim submitted." 15 Because the primary purpose of these penalties was to provide restitution to the government for money it had been deprived of by fraud, the statute was intended to be a remedial one. 16 In interpreting the FCA, the Supreme Court has agreed that it is remedial in nature. "We think the chief purpose of the [Act's civil penalties] was to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely whole." 17 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bramblett, explained that the original statute penalized presentment for payment or approval of false claims upon or against the government and any false statement made "for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of such claim." 18 A statement or record under the FCA is a false assertion made as a part of the claim. 19 In United States v. McNinch, the Supreme Court suggested that a "claim" under the FCA is a demand for money or property that induces the government to disburse funds or "otherwise suffer immediate financial detriment." 20 is material or it "has a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," it makes the claim false. 21 In its original form, the FCA protected the government from both false claims and false statements until 1948 when Congress split the FCA into two different statutes. 22 Currently, the FCA contains both civil 23 and criminal 24 provisions. This Note discusses only the civil provision.
As the FCA evolved, it was used more generally to protect governmental funds and property from false or fraudulent claims. 25 In fact, Congress has provided the FCA as the exclusive remedy for recovering damages from all attempts to cause the government to pay out money as a result of false or fraudulent claims. 26 The Supreme Court stated that in enacting the FCA, "Congress wrote expansively, meaning to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government."
27
The FCA covers all claims to governmental money, even if a claimant does not have a direct connection to the government. In 1986, Congress responded to an estimated thirty percent increase in contractor fraud cases. 34 At this time, it was estimated that the United States was losing more than fifty billion dollars a year to false claims in all areas of government. 35 Congress wanted to deter fraud against the government and took the opportunity to clarify the courts' confusion on the purpose and application of the FCA. 36 Before 1986, courts were declaring that the FCA was penal in nature and that the government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence to recover. 37 Because Congress was "[f]rustrated with courts mandating higher burdens of proof for false claims,"
38 it also intended to reinforce its remedial purpose and to send a strong message to the courts that the FCA should be construed broadly. 39 In the 1986 amendments, Congress clarified that the government's burden of proof for an FCA claim was by a preponderance of the evidence, the lowest standard. Prior to the 1986 amendments, the FCA provided for double damages and a maximum two thousand dollar civil penalty. 42 The Supreme Court discussed this provision in 1976 and concluded "that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely whole." 43 One of the most significant changes Congress instituted with its 1986 amendments was the increase from double damages to treble damages. 44 Due to this change, the Act took on a slight aspect of punishment. 45 However, a fact finder's primary duty had not changed: "if it finds liability, its instruction is to return a verdict for actual damages," which a court may then multiply. 46 In addition to the change to treble damages, the amendments also increased the civil penalties from two thousand dollars to "not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000." 47 While it is arguable that the increase may have been due to Congress's desire to deter fraud against the government, the increase is most likely attributable to inflation.
48
The amendments served their intended purpose and produced their intended effect. 49 64 Additionally, it created a defense for entities that did not seek to defraud the government directly, but sought to defraud the government indirectly to receive governmental funds. 65 To clarify that the FCA carries with it no requirement of intent on behalf of the defendant, FERA eliminated the phrase "to get" from former § 3729(a)(2) and "defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent 53 67 This decision also created a defense for individuals presenting claims to government grantees or contractors even though the claims were paid with government funds.
68
As a result, Congress removed the "presentment clause" from the statute and amended the definition of "claim." 69 Additionally, although Congress did not change the civil penalties that can be assessed under the FCA with the 2009 amendments, it did create a provision to adjust them for inflation. 70 With all the detailed changes to the FCA under FERA, the main purpose was to enforce and, once again, reinstate the broad, remedial purpose of the Act, which Congress considered particularly important in this economic climate with the disbursement of billions of dollars in government stimulus funds. or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government." 76 The Court held that "a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended that the false statement be material to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim," 77 which created an intent element for FCA claims under § 3729(a)(2). The Court required that for a defendant to be liable under this section, he must have subjectively intended the false statement to be material to the government's decision to pay the claim. 78 The creation of this additional requirement was one of the main reasons Congress passed the 2009 amendments.
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Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders did not resolve the dispute as to whether materiality is an independent element of an FCA claim, nor did it examine whether false statements must be material from the government's point of view when it objectively decides whether or not to pay a claim. 80 However, Congress likely resolved the dispute over whether materiality is an element of an FCA claim when it removed the intent element from former § 3729(a)(2) by replacing "to get" with the phrase "material to." 81 Congress defined material as "having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property."
82 Congress also added a materiality requirement to a reverse claim brought under § 3729(a)(1)(G). 83 Therefore, the issue as to whether materiality is an element of § 3729(a)(1)(B) and (G) of the FCA has seemingly been resolved. However, Congress failed to resolve the issue of whether materiality is an element of an FCA claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A In applying the first step of the Wells framework, the court found that a natural reading of the statute supported the presence of a materiality element under the FCA. 95 The court analyzed former 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (2), and (7) Essentially, one cannot get a false or fraudulent claim paid unless the false statement is important or material to the government's decisionmaking process.
Finally, the court analyzed former subsection seven, which imposed liability on any person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government." 104 The court declared that a false statement under this subsection of the FCA can only "avoid or decrease an obligation if that statement is material to the money or property owed to the Government."
105 Similar to the logic used in analyzing subsection two, one cannot decrease an obligation to the government unless the false statement used was material to the government in its decision-making process. 2000)). After the 2009 amendments, this subsection imposes liability on a person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government." 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West Supp. 2009).
105. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 443.
A district court also analyzed the literal language of the FCA in scholarly detail and arrived at the same conclusion. 106 In its analysis, the court studiously considered the words of the statute, which led to the conclusion that the defendant's statements or conduct that form the basis of an FCA complaint must result in a claim that is false or fraudulent. Statements or conduct make a claim false only if they are material to the defendant's entitlement to the money or property claimed. 107 The court concluded that
[a] natural reading of the term "false or fraudulent claim" is consistent with the implied materiality requirement that the courts have consistently recognized. By requiring a claim that is false or fraudulent, rather than a claim that contains false or fraudulent statements, the FCA implicitly requires statements or conduct that are material to the person's entitlement to the money or property claimed before liability can arise. 117 Accordingly, the Court in its conclusion analyzed the term "fraud" and held that in using the term, Congress intended to "incorporate the 'well-settled meaning at common law,' which included proof of materiality."
118 In its decision, the Supreme Court declared, "we cannot infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that Congress intended to drop that element from the fraud statutes."
119 In its conclusion, the Court stated "we must presume that Congress intended to incorporate materiality unless the statute otherwise dictates."
120
The same reasoning applies to the FCA-one must presume that Congress intended materiality to be an element unless the statute otherwise dictates. Therefore, the common law requires an element of materiality under § 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA.
c. The Third
Step of the Wells Framework and the FCA The last step in the Wells framework is to analyze the statutory and legislative history. 121 The Senate report regarding the 1986 amendments states that the FCA was amended "to provide that an individual who makes a material misrepresentation to avoid paying money owed the Government would be equally liable under the Act as if he had submitted a false claim to receive money."
122 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that Congress implicitly required and intended materiality to be an element of an FCA claim. [i]t is insufficient for a plaintiff asserting a § 3729(a)(2) claim to show merely that the false statement's use resulted in payment or approval of the claim . . . . Instead, such a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended that the false statement be material to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim. 125 Subsection three imposes liability on a person who "conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid."
126 Similarly under former § 3729(a)(3), the Court held that "it must be established that [the alleged conspirators] agreed that the statement would have a material effect on the Government's decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim." 127 The Court reasoned that the absence of a requirement of materiality under the intent element "would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating 'fraud against the Government.'" 128 Although Congress disagreed that the FCA should include an intent element, it did not discuss or analyze a requirement of materiality.
129
While the Court's holding in Allison Engine Co. does not discuss whether materiality is an independent element of a § 3729(a)(1)(A) FCA claim or whether false statements must be material from the government's point of view in its decision-making process, the Court's logic can be equally applied to these issues. Without an objective requirement of materiality under this subsection, the FCA would be expanded beyond its intended purpose. Accordingly, by applying its logic in Allison Engine Co., it is clear that the Supreme Court would find that § 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA includes an element of materiality.
Materiality is, therefore, implicitly required under § 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA. A natural reading of the statute's text supports the presence of a requirement of materiality, and Congress implied the element of materiality within the common law meaning of the word "fraud." 
Natural Tendency Test
The name for this test stems from the definition of materiality provided by the Court in Neder. 142 The courts essentially turned this vague statement-that a false statement is material if it has "a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed"-into a standard by which materiality is determined under the FCA. 143 Under the natural tendency test, courts should consider "whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence agency action or is capable of influencing agency action." 144 The Sixth Circuit in Medshares Management Group has probably provided the strongest assessment and analysis for using this test. 145 The court declared that this standard "focuses on the potential effect of the false statement when it is made, not on the actual effect of the false statement when it is discovered" 146 and is thus "more consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, which attaches liability upon presentment of a false or fraudulent claim, rather than actual payment on that claim."
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The court also reasoned that "liability under the FCA is punishable by a civil penalty in addition to any damages which the Government actually sustains, which reinforces the conclusion that the actual result is not dispositive of liability under the FCA." 148 Essentially, the court was using the logic that "there is no language in section 3729(a)(1) that mandates actual payment by the government or the need to establish damages." 149 Additionally, the court declared that the natural tendency test is more consistent with the purpose of the FCA: KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
[E]valuating materiality based on the potential effect rather than actual result is more consistent with the underlying purpose of the FCA. The United States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the statute to cover all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money. We have similarly held that recovery under the FCA is not dependent upon the government's sustaining monetary damages. These holdings are consistent with the FCA's principal goal of ensuring the integrity of the Government's dealings, which is embodied in the maxim that [m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.
150
Therefore, the focus of the natural tendency test is on the potential effect of the false statement or claim rather than its actual effect.
Outcome Determinative Test
In contrast, some circuits apply the more restrictive outcome determinative test, which was derived from the text of the FCA. This test "requires a showing that the alleged fraudulent actions had 'the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally deprive the United States of money it is lawfully due. '" 151 In applying this test, the Eighth Circuit has held that "where the plaintiff cannot show that the government agency would have acted differently had it known of the omission, ' is lawfully due, are properly considered "claims" within the meaning of the FCA.
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit applied the outcome determinative test to a claim under former 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). 156 It reasoned that this subsection of the FCA prohibits the submission of a false record or statement, but "it does so only when the submission of the record or statement was done in an attempt to get a false claim paid. There is no liability under [the FCA] for a false statement unless it is used to get a false claim paid." 157 The court placed significant weight on the "express connection of a false statement with 'getting' a false claim paid" and declared it "tantamount to requiring that the false statement be material to the payment decision."
158 For this proposition, the court cited and based its reasoning on Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, which declares that the FCA "was not intended to impose liability for every false statement made to the government." 159 By using the outcome determinative test, the court held that "[i]t is only those claims for money or property to which a defendant is not entitled that are 'false' for purposes of the False Claims Act." 160 
IV. SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT TEST PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance in interpreting the FCA and has seemingly contradicted itself regarding the definition of materiality and the purpose of the statute. The problem has been exacerbated by lower courts' difficulty in carefully reading the statute and applying the Supreme Court's interpretations. Because the status of the FCA in the courts is in such disarray, a unifying standard must be put in place to preserve the fraud deterrence purpose of the statute. Otherwise, as some have speculated, "Congress may be forced to once again enact amendments to the FCA in order to restore the [ The lower courts' confusion is inhibiting the statute's effectiveness in fighting fraud against the government. The courts need a simple test that is consistent with Congress's objective in adopting the statute-to deter fraud and provide restitution to the government for its losses from false claims. However, the test must not be so broad as to include trivial falsehoods that are outside the purview of the statute. The test should be a substantial weight test: while the government need not actually have paid out on the false claim, the alleged false statement must be the type often considered by the government in the decision-making process, and its effect must be given substantial weight in the government's decision with respect to payment of the claim.
A. Congress Intended the FCA to Be Restitutionary
The Senate Report accompanying the 1986 amendments to the FCA expressly stated that "[t]he purpose of [the amendments] is to enhance the Government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government." 162 The Supreme Court has supported this purpose by indicating that "the [FCA's] primary purpose is to indemnify the government-through its restitutionary penalty provisions-against losses caused by a defendant's fraud." 163 The following excerpt from a Second Circuit case eloquently sets forth the underlying purpose of the statute.
Since the Act is restitutionary and aimed at retrieving ill-begotten funds, it would be anomalous to find liability when the alleged noncompliance would not have influenced the government's decision to pay. Accordingly, while the Act is intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government, it does not encompass those instances of regulatory noncompliance that are irrelevant to the government's disbursement decisions. 164. Id. at 697 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Additionally, Congress described the FCA as a "tool used to recover funds lost to fraud and abuse," 165 and in no way described the Act as punitive. 166 Because it is clear that the Act's primary purpose is restitutionary, courts should not use it to punish all claimants who inadvertently make false statements that are irrelevant to the decisionmaking entity in its decision-making process.
B. The Natural Tendency and Outcome Determinative Tests Are Flawed and Inappropriately Applied By Some Courts
While no judicially created test is without its shortcomings, the natural tendency and outcome determinative tests are seriously flawed. Courts are having difficulty applying the tests consistently among FCA violators. The natural tendency test is far too broad, which could cause inconsistent outcomes among claims under the FCA. It also imposes a more punitive aspect on claims under the FCA, despite the clear restitutionary purpose of the statute, by punishing claims that were not meant to be within the purview of the statute.
The outcome determinative test is too strict and severely weakens the fraud deterrent effect of the statute and ability of the government to protect its federal relief funds and assistance programs during this current economic crisis. Additionally, some courts professing to apply one test seem to use the requirements of the other.
Natural Tendency Test
A serious problem with the natural tendency test is that there is no standard by which to measure how influential the false claim or statement must be. Any small error in the claim or in a statement could "potentially" affect the government's decision to pay, but what is unclear is the level of potentiality the statement or claim must have before it is considered material. The courts are silent on this issue, and Congress's general definition of "material" provides no guidance. Allowing such broad discretion could cause severe discrepancies between similar cases in front of different courts. Even if both courts profess to apply the natural tendency test, one court may take the view that the claim did not have enough potential or "natural tendency to influence," while another By applying such a broad test for determining materiality, the natural tendency test sweeps in many false statements and claims that were not intended to be within the purview of the statute. By requiring those submitting these claims to pay the $10,000-per-false-claim forfeiture, the courts are assigning a punitive aspect to the FCA that was not originally intended by Congress. As articulated in the Sixth Circuit, these courts believe that when Congress increased the fine from $2000 to $10,000 with the 1986 amendments, it implied that the statute was meant to be more punitive in nature. 167 This assumption cannot be true. A simple inflation calculation completely contradicts this notion. Two thousand dollars in 1863 is equal to approximately $17,850 in 1986. 168 This calculation actually leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to adjust the penalty for inflation and decrease the punitive effect of the civil penalties. Additionally, in considering the 2009 amendments, Congress had the opportunity to raise the civil penalty but did not and merely provided an inflation adjustment provision. 169 Additionally, in unique cases under the natural tendency test, a person may be held liable and subject to $10,000 in civil penalties when the false claim had the effect of causing the government to underpay the person what he was owed. This situation was discussed in the Fourth Circuit in United States ex rel. Schell v. Battle Creek Health System.
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The court analyzed a hospital's cost and billing methods for anesthesia provided to patients.
171
The hospital received Medicare funds incrementally based upon cost estimates without regard to the billing methods. 172 In essence, the alleged violation did not harm the government; in fact, the government may have underpaid the Medicare costs of the defendant.
176
Circuits applying the natural tendency test have been imposing liability under the FCA as if it is a punitive statute. To the contrary, the FCA was intended to be restitutionary, and the additional civil penalty of $10,000 was to ensure that the government was entirely reimbursed for its loss.
177
These discrepancies and inconsistent outcomes regarding fraud under the FCA are undermining the aim of the FCA-to deter fraud against the government. Additionally, these courts are attempting to convert the purpose of the statute from restitutionary to punitive in nature. This strict punitive interpretation is not what the drafters of the FCA intended.
Outcome Determinative Test
There are also problems with the restrictive outcome determinative test. While the purpose of the FCA is remedial in nature, "there is no language in [ §] 3729(a)(1) that mandates actual payment by the government or the need to establish damages."
178 In fact, "[t]he statutory language supports the view that proof of damages is not a prerequisite for suit under the FCA."
179 Therefore, the outcome determinative test would not find a person liable who satisfies all the elements of the FCA if the government happened to catch the falsity before it paid the claim. Essentially then, this test puts substantial weight on the government's actions to determine the materiality of the claim and not on the nature of the defendant's statements or claims. This situation also undermines the fraud deterrent aim of the FCA because of the potential inconsistent application of the statute.
The outcome determinative test forces courts to apply the statute narrowly and restrictively, which decreases its deterrent effect and makes protection of government funds from fraud more difficult. Additionally, 175 . Id. at 543 (Cook, J., dissenting). An expert for Battle Creek concluded that the cost-tocharge ratio by which Medicare was to pay Battle Creek barely changed through the 1990s and may have even caused Medicare to underpay Battle Creek. This expert's testimony was unchallenged by the plaintiff. 182 Therefore, the court held that the false statements were not material. 183 Because the court looked at whether the statements were "central" to the government's decision to pay the claim and at whether the claim would have been paid without the statements, the court was trying to determine if the false statements would have affected the outcome or the government's decision to pay. If the court were truly applying the natural tendency test, it would be analyzing whether the false statements had the potential to affect the decision of the government, not whether the statements actually affected the outcome. The uncertainty of what test courts will apply only exacerbates the problem that the FCA is not consistently applied and further undermines the fraud deterrent purpose of the statute. While no judicial test is perfect, especially one for a vague and elusive concept like materiality, the natural tendency and outcome determinative tests are failing to further the purpose of the statute. Instead, these tests are actually undermining the statute's aims of protecting government funds from fraud and abuse and deterring fraud. Additionally, in the current economic climate where financial fraud is constantly in the limelight and deterrence is a very important tool, it is critical that courts apply a unified standard. The courts need a test that is consistent with Congressional intent, furthers the purposes of the FCA, and can be more consistently applied in all courts across the country.
C. The Test for Materiality Under the FCA Should Be the Substantial Weight Test
Because the natural tendency test is too broad and the outcome determinative test is too restrictive, courts need a test that balances the remedial and punitive aspects of the FCA. The courts should apply a substantial weight test for materiality under the FCA. Because the statute provides for a civil penalty in addition to damages, the government need not actually suffer damages for a defendant to incur liability under the FCA. However, the false claim or statement must be given substantial weight by the governmental decision-making entity-it must be one that the government typically considers when making decisions to pay similar claims. If the false statement or claim is trivial and is not given substantial weight in the decision-making process, it is outside the purview of the statute, and the claimant cannot incur liability under the FCA. The Supreme Court has developed a similar test for materiality under different statutes. Additionally, the text and purpose of the statute supports such a test.
The Supreme Court Supports the Substantial Weight Test in Other
Legal Contexts A test similar to the substantial weight test for materiality is used in the context of torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a general definition of materiality and advises that a matter is material if (a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it. 184 The Restatement definition, among several other tests, has been applied by the Third Circuit in analyzing whether a statement was material in the context of the FCA. 185 The circuit cited Neder as authority for using the definition. 186 The Supreme Court in Kungys v. United States considered a test bearing significant similarities to the proposed substantial weight test under a denaturalization statute.
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Four Justices found "Kungys's misstatements of his date and place of birth on his naturalization application not material because those statements were neither relevant to citizenship qualifications nor, if correctly reported, would they have led to other facts relevant to qualifications for citizenship." 188 The Court's analysis is similar to the substantial weight test because it considers whether the misstatements would be given any weight by the naturalization board in its decision regarding Kungys's citizenship qualifications.
The Supreme Court's decision in TSC Industries, Inc., v. Northway, Inc. lends even stronger support for the use of the substantial weight test for determining materiality under the FCA. 189 The Court considered the definition of "material" under the proxy rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 190 The proxy rules under this Act bar the use of "proxy statements that are false or misleading with respect to the presentation or omission of material facts." 191 The Court stated that the question of materiality is "an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact . . . ." 192 It also recognized that the rule's "broad remedial purpose" was important in formulating a standard of materiality. 193 The Court considered a test that was adopted by the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
A Plain Reading of the Text and the Purpose of the FCA Support the Substantial Weight Test
To tailor the test for materiality to the FCA, it is important to look to the text of the statute. The FCA imposes liability upon a person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim." 200 Although the phrase "to get" was written out of the statute with the 2009 amendments, Congress's reasoning for doing so was to ensure that courts would not interpret "to get" as an intent element rather than to help define the test for materiality. 201 As a result, it is useful to look at the prior phrasing of the Act to ascertain what Congress meant in drafting the statute and to determine the purpose implied in the text.
Prior to the 2009 amendments, one subsection of the FCA imposed liability on anyone who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government." 202 Completely setting aside the issue of intent, courts used the phrase "to get" to interpret a materiality requirement. 203 The reasoning was that the use of a false statement could only serve to induce the government to disburse money if it was material to the claim. 204 Thus, liability under the FCA does not arise only because the claim includes a false statement, but "the claim itself must be false or fraudulent." 205 "A false statement within a claim can only serve to make the entire claim itself fraudulent if that statement is material to the request or demand for money or property." 206 A statement cannot be material to the request or demand for money or property unless it is one that is given significant weight in the decision-making process by the governmental entity or contractor.
Essentially then, under the FCA, a person cannot submit a record or statement material to a claim unless the statement is clearly one typically considered by the governmental entity in determining which claims to pay. Therefore, to further the broad remedial purpose of the statute and to maintain consistency with how the Supreme Court has interpreted the FCA, the test for materiality should be the substantial weight test.
While the proponents of the outcome determinative test may criticize the substantial weight test as more difficult to apply, the Supreme Court has declared that "ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of [statutes] and Congress' policy decisions." 208 the test must provide flexibility to different situations. The substantial weight test provides this flexibility by allowing courts to perform a case-by-case analysis of whether the false claim or statement is one that would typically be given substantial weight in the governmental entity's decision-making process.
V. CONCLUSION
The current status of materiality within the context of the FCA could force Congress to once again clarify the purpose and amend the statute. For congressional economy, the courts should apply the substantial weight test. While the government need not actually have paid out on the false claim, the alleged false statement must be the type often considered by the government in the decision-making process, and its effect must be given substantial weight in the government's decision to pay the claim. This test is consistent with the general definition set forth by the Supreme Court in Neder and with the purpose of the FCA as set forth in the legislative history. Courts would be able to apply this test for materiality more uniformly and, thus, the FCA would be interpreted more consistently by different courts, which would increase the fraud deterrent effect of the FCA. The substantial weight test would more effectively further the underlying purposes of the FCA.
